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Abstract 
In this essay, I will argue that there are moral requirements which are requirements of 
practical reason that apply to all agents independent of their motives. First, I will outline 
the argument for the thesis of reason internalism and then briefly set up the resulting 
problem for the rational authority of morality. To resolve this problem, I will argue for a 
principle of reason transmission. From this principle, I will argue that there are cases in 
which agents fail to have a reason for action, regardless of their motivations. Further, I 
argue that these are universal requirements. Thus, I conclude that there are actions that 
rationality requires all agents not to do.  
1.1 Introduction 
      The problem for the rational authority of morality results from the apparent 
inconsistency of the theses of moral objectivity, moral internalism, reason internalism, 
and egoism. However, I will argue that there is no problem for the rational authority of 
morality and that these four theses are in fact consistent with each other. To do so, I will 
argue for a principle of reason transmission and show that, in virtue of this principle of 
reason transmission and reason internalism, there are cases in which agents fail to have a 
reason for action, regardless of their motivations. Furthermore, that these are universal 
requirements and thus there are actions that rationality requires all agents not to do.  
1.2 Reason Internalism 
Reason internalism is an answer to the question as to whether external reasons for 
action exist. External reasons are understood as reasons for action that are independent of 
the agent’s motivations. In contrast, internal reasons for action are those which depend on 
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the agent’s motivations. Famously, Bernard Williams argued that external reasons for 
action do not exist. His argument for such a conclusion is as follows: 
i) If a reason is a reason for action, then it could be someone’s reason for acting 
on a particular occasion. 
ii) If it could be someone’s reason for acting on a particular occasion, then it 
would figure in an explanation of that action. 
iii) No external reason statement could by itself offer an explanation of anyone’s 
action.  
iv) Thus, an external reason could not be someone’s reason for acting on a 
particular occasion. 
v) Therefore, an external reason cannot be a reason for action.1 
The significance of this argument is that if an external reason cannot be a reason for 
action, then all reasons for action must be dependent on the agent’s motivations. As 
Christine Korsgaard notes, “it seems to be a requirement on practical reasons, that they be 
capable of motivating us.” 2 This requirement can be formalized as a necessary condition 
for being a reason for an action.  
(Reason Internalism) There is a reason for A to do X only if doing X satisfies some 
element of A’s subjective motivational set.3 
However, this requirement poses a central problem for any ethical theory that supposes 
the rational authority of morality. 
1.3 The Problem for the Rational Authority of Morality 
 The problem is that the thesis of reason internalism is incompatible with the 
following three theses taken together: 
(Moral Objectivity) Moral requirements apply to all agents independent of their motives. 
(Moral Internalism) Moral requirements are requirements of practical reason. 
(Egoism) There is no necessary connection between the motives of different agents.
 4
 
                                                 
1
 Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, ed. Russ 
Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 295. 
2
 Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," Jounral of Philosophy, 83, no. 1 (1986): 11. 
3
 Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, ed. Russ 
Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 292-298. 
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Together the first two theses entail that morality provides agents with categorical 
imperatives. These categorical imperatives are requirements of practical reason that apply 
to all agents independent of their motives. There seems to be a problem for the rational 
authority of morality, if we accept egoism and reason internalism. The problem is that if 
we take these two theses seriously, then “the man who rejects morality because he sees 
no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency. Nor will 
his actions necessarily be irrational.”5 In other words, egoism and reason internalism 
entails that morality cannot have any rational authority; morality cannot universally 
provide agents with reasons for action.  
In an attempt to resolve this inconsistency, philosophers have argued for the 
rejection of each of the different theses. For the remainder of this essay, I will argue that 
there is no problem for the rational authority of morality. In other words, I will argue that 
these four theses are consistent with each other. I do concede that reason internalism and 
the thesis of egoism are inconsistent with some categorical imperatives; in particular, 
those categorical imperatives that require agents to do certain actions, or positive duties.  
However, as I will argue, there is no inconsistency with categorical imperatives that 
require agents to not do certain actions, or negative duties. 
2.1 The Principle of Instrumental Reasoning 
The most familiar principle of practical reason is the principle of instrumental 
reasoning. This principle states that by willing an end, rationality requires that one wills 
the necessary means to that end. In other words, if I intend an end, then I should take the 
                                                                                                                                                 
4
 David Brink, "A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Morality," Nous-Supplement: Philosophical 
Perspectives, 6 (1992): 1. 
5
 Foot Philippa, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, 
ed. Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 289. 
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necessary means to that end. However, this is not the principle of practical reason needed 
to show what reasons for action there are for an agent. First, this principle derives a 
normative claim from a seemingly non-normative claim; that I should take the means to 
my ends is surely normative, whereas intending an end is not apparently so. If intending, 
or willing, an end is not normative, then we are faced with Hume’s objection that one 
cannot generate an “ought” from an “is.” Christine Korsgaard addresses this problem by 
arguing that “you must think that the fact that you will an end is a reason for the end.”6 
Thinking that the fact that you will an end is a reason for that end may make the means 
normative, you should think there is a reason for the means to that end, but thinking so 
does not, by its self, make it the case that there is a reason for the end or the means. 
Clearly, there is a difference between thinking that the fact that you will an end is 
a reason for the end and it being the case that there is a reason for the end. To see that 
intention is not normative in this way, we need only to look at an example from Bernard 
Williams. Suppose there is a glass of clear liquid before me and I have a thirst for a gin 
and tonic. Believing the clear liquid to be gin, I intend to mix it with tonic and drink it. 
Yet, suppose that the clear liquid is in fact petrol. Though I intend to mix it with tonic and 
drink it, we want to say that I do not have a reason to do so.
 7
  Through this example, we 
can see that intending to do something is not the same as there being a reason to do so. 
2.2 The Right Kind of “Should” 
Additionally, we should draw a distinction concerning different senses of the term 
“should.” As such, the “should” used in the instrumental principle is not the reason for 
                                                 
6
 Christine Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," The Constitution of Agency, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 58. 
7
 Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, ed. Russ 
Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 293. 
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action “should.” Rather, this is the “should” of good practical thought.8 To explicate this 
concept of “good practical thought” as distinct from “reason for action,” let us return to 
the example from Williams. In the example, we can say that since I intend to mix the 
clear liquid with tonic and drink it and to do so I must fetch some tonic, then the principle 
of instrumental reason states that I should fetch some tonic. This “should” is a “should” 
of good practical thought, not reason for action. This can be seen, if we again suppose 
that the clear liquid is not gin, but rather petrol. In this case, it is not true that I have a 
reason to mix the clear liquid with tonic and drink it. Thus, it is not true that I have a 
reason to fetch the tonic. However, since I intend to mix it with tonic and drink it, it is 
“reasonable” that I fetch the tonic. In other words, by fetching the tonic, though I do not 
have a reason to do so, I am still acting rationally or, as Williams would say, I am acting 
rational relative to a false belief.
9
 Thus, when the instrumental principle states that I 
should do M, it is saying that to be rational, relative to my intention to do E, I must do M. 
However, it is not saying is that there is a reason for me to do M. 
2.3 A Different Principle of Practical Reason 
Taking this into account, we should use a similar, but distinct principle of 
practical reason. This is the principle of means-end transmission, which states that: 
(Transmission) If you should do E, all things considered, and doing M is a necessary 
means to doing E, then you should do M, all things considered, too.
10
 
The principle of transmission avoids the difficulties of the instrumental principle. It 
derives a normative claim from another normative claim and thus is not subject to 
                                                 
8
 Kieran Setiya, "Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason," Ethics, 117, no. 4 (2007): 649-673. 
9
 Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, ed. Russ 
Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 293. 
10
 Kieran Setiya, "Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason," Ethics, 117, no. 4 (2007): 652. 
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Hume’s criticism. Furthermore, it is the appropriate kind of “should,” the reason for 
action “should.” Though this principle is different than the instrumental principle, it gets 
to the intuition about means-end reasoning that leads many to accept the principle of 
instrumental reasoning. 
2.4 Necessary Means 
If we understand this “should” as the reason for action “should,” one may 
question why having a reason to do E commits them to having a reason to do M.
11
 The 
answer seems to be that M is necessary for doing E. However, one may ask, what is it for 
M to be “necessary” for doing E? We can understand being a necessary means as being 
part of the conditions of satisfaction of E. A condition of satisfaction of E is that which 
cannot fail to be the case, if it is to be the case that E.  It is that which cannot fail to be the 
case, if one is to be judged as to have successfully done E.
12
 We can offer two accounts 
of being a part of the conditions of satisfaction: 
(Specific Account) M is part of the conditions of satisfaction for A to do E iff in this 
particular case it cannot fail to be the case that M, if A does E. 
(General Account) M is part of the conditions of satisfaction for A to do E iff in all cases 
it cannot fail to be the case that M, if A does E. 
As such, the set of M’s entailed by the general account is a subset of the set of M’s entail 
by the specific account. To clarify these accounts, let us look to an example from John 
Searle.  
Suppose that there is a reason for me to fix your tooth and it is true of this 
particular case that if I fix your tooth, then I will cause you pain. On the specific account, 
                                                 
11
 John Searle, Rationality in Action, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), 263-266. 
12
 John Searle, Rationality in Action, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), 263-266. 
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we would conclude that, in virtue of my reason to fix your tooth, I have a reason to cause 
you pain. This is because, in this particular case, I cannot fix your tooth without it being 
the case that I cause you pain. Though it is part of the conditions of satisfaction of fixing 
your tooth in this particular case, it is not part of the conditions of satisfaction for fixing 
your tooth in all cases. For example, had the facts about this case been different and I 
failed to cause you pain, it would not entail that I failed to fix your tooth; maybe in this 
different case I am a much better dentist or used anesthetics. Therefore, on the general 
account, we would conclude that I do not have a reason to cause you pain; causing you 
pain is at most a by-product of fixing your tooth.  
In so far as the set of M’s entailed by the general account is a subset of the set of 
M’s entailed by the specific account, it is sufficient for our purposes to move forward 
using the general account. For if we can show that an agent has a negative duty with 
regards to an M entailed by the general account, then that duty with regards to that M will 
apply to agents in all cases. Thus it provides the universality required for a categorical 
imperative. To show that an agent has a negative duty with regards to an M entailed by 
the specific account, but which is not entailed by the general account will require a 
further argument that I will not provide in this essay. Considering this account of 
“necessary means” and understanding that this “should” is the “should” of practical 
reason for action, we can define the principle of transmission as: 
(Transmission*) If there is a reason to do E, all things considered, and doing M is part of 
the conditions of satisfaction of E, then there is a reason to do M, all things considered, 
too. 
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2.5 All Things Considered 
 Some may question what is meant by the qualification “all things considered.” It 
should be understood as the conditions for being an all-in practical reason for action, 
which is different than being a pro tanto practical reason for action. The pro tanto 
practical reason counts in favor of doing an action, but it is “slack” in that I can fail to act 
for a pro tanto practical reason and still be rational.
13
 However, if I failed to act for my 
all-in practical reason for action, then I would have failed to act rationally. The all-in 
practical reason for action is based on all the relevant facts. This includes the fact about 
how the agent weighs the elements of her subjective motivational set. Now, I want to be 
careful and clarify that I am not supposing that any principle of reasoning is involved in 
the weighing of the elements of the agent’s subjective motivational set. The principle of 
transmission is compatible with various theories about how these elements could be 
weighed. The reason that figures in the principle of transmission is that reason which the 
agent has posterior to the elements have been weighed. Further, the “weighing” of the 
elements need not be a deliberate conscious process; the agent need not be aware of how 
the elements of her subjective motivational set are weighed. 
2.6 An Equivalent Principle of Transmission 
 The principle of transmission can be reformulated into a principle that states when 
there fails to be a reason to do E, all things considered, that is equivalent to 
transmission*: 
(Transmission**) If there is no reason to do M, all things considered, and doing M is 
part of the conditions of satisfaction of E, then there is no reason to do E, all things 
considered, too. 
                                                 
13
 John Broome, "Normative Requirements," Ratio, 12, no. 4 (1999): 398-419. 
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It is easy to see how this is equivalent to transmission*. Suppose that there is no reason to 
do M, all things considered. By modus tollens on the conditional that is transmission*, 
we can infer that the conjunction “there is a reason to do E, all things considered, and 
doing M is part of the conditions of satisfaction of E” is false. We know that a 
conjunction is false when either one or both the conjuncts are false. If we suppose that it 
is true that doing M is part of the conditions of satisfaction of E, then we can infer it is 
false that there is a reason to do E, all things considered.  
3.1 Reasons for the Conditions of Satisfaction to be Met 
In this section, I hope to demonstrate that, in virtue of transmission**, there are 
particular kinds of cases in which an agent can fail to have a reason to do an action 
despite the agent’s motivations to do that action. In particular, there can fail to be a 
reason to engage in sex with or end the life of another person because of the necessary 
means for doing such actions.  
The Case of having Sex with Another Person  
In the case of having sex with another person, if anyone is to successfully have 
sex with another person, then that other person cannot fail to have sex with that person. 
For example, in order for Jack to have sex with Jill, Jill must have sex with Jack. Jack 
could not have successfully had sex with Jill, if Jill failed to have had sex with Jack. Jill’s 
having sex with Jack is a necessary means for Jack to have sex with Jill; it is part of the 
conditions of satisfaction of Jack having sex with Jill. Furthermore, this is true not just in 
the case of Jack and Jill, but in all cases in which anyone has sex with another person. 
Knowing the conditions of satisfaction for having sex with another person, we 
must ask whether there is a reason, all things considered, for these conditions to be met. 
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In other words, is there a reason, all things considered, for Jill to have sex with Jack? I 
contend that, in virtue of reason internalism, whether such a reason exists depends on Jill 
and her motivations, not Jack and his motivations. Since reason internalism states that 
there is a reason for A to do X only if doing X satisfies some element of A’s subjective 
motivational set, then there is a reason for Jill to have sex with Jack only if having sex 
with Jack satisfies some element of Jill’s subjective motivational set. Furthermore, the 
principle of transmission requires that this reason not be a pro tanto reason, but rather a 
reason all things considered. Thus, for there to be a reason, all things considered, for Jill 
to have sex with Jack, there must be an element which having sex with Jack would satisfy 
that outweighs those elements that not having sex with Jack would satisfy. Certainly, 
there are cases in which there could be such a reason. Yet, surely it could also be the case 
that there is no reason, all things considered, for Jill to have sex with Jack. In such cases 
where there is no reason, all things considered, for Jill to have sex with Jack, we should 
conclude from transmission** that there is no reason for Jack to have sex with Jill, all 
things considered. 
The Case of Ending Another Person’s Life 
Likewise, in order for anyone to end the life of another person, it cannot fail to be 
the case that the other person never does anything ever again. For example, in order for 
Bob to have ended Bill’s life, Bill must not do anything ever again. Bob could not have 
successfully ended Bill’s life, if Bill went on to engage in various future activities.14 Bill 
not doing anything ever again is part of the conditions of satisfaction of Bob ending Bill’s 
                                                 
14
 This is our natural understanding of the conditions for being dead; leaving out the possibility of divine 
intervention or the “living dead.” Furthermore, it is true that not doing various activities is not sufficient for 
being dead, but it does seem to be necessary. 
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life.  Again, this is true not just in the case of Bob and Bill, but in all cases in which 
anyone ends the life of another person.  
Knowing the conditions of satisfaction for ending the life of another person, we 
again must ask whether there is a reason, all things considered, for these conditions to be 
met. In other words, is there a reason, all things considered, for Bill to never do anything 
ever again? Again, in virtue of reason internalism, whether such a reason exists depends 
on Bill and his motivations, not Bob and his motivations. Reason internalism requires 
that for there to be a reason for Bill to never do anything ever again, that it be true that 
never doing anything ever again would satisfy some element in Bill’s subjective 
motivational set or that there is no element of Bill’s subjective motivational set that any 
future activity would satisfy. Additionally, that element which never doing anything ever 
again would satisfy must outweigh every element that would be satisfied by doing 
something. Again, there could be cases in which there are reasons, all things considered, 
to never do anything ever again. Yet, it could also be the case that there is a reason, all 
things considered, for Bill to do something in the future. In cases where there is a reason, 
all things considered, for Bill to do something in the future, we should conclude from 
transmission** that there is no reason for Bob to end Bill’s life, all things considered. 
3.2 Explanation of Actions 
 One may object that this is just not true. Jack, having weighed the elements of his 
subjective motivational set, is most motivated to have sex with Jill. Moreover, Jack’s 
motivation can explain both Jack’s and Jill’s actions. The objection is that Jack’s 
motivation meets the internalist requirement for being a reason for action. Similarly, Bob 
is most motivated to end Bill’s life and his motivation can explain why Bill never does 
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anything ever again. This too meets the internalist requirement for being a reason for 
action. Therefore, there is a reason for Jack to have sex with Jill and a reason for Bob to 
end Bill’s life. 
The problem with this objection is that it has confused an explanatory reason with 
a normative reason. It is true that both Jack’s and Bob’s motivations would explain their 
actions, as well as Jill’s and Bill’s actions. Furthermore, it is true that reason internalism 
requires that normative reasons for action be explanatory of the actions; it must be able to 
function in an explanation of the action. However, it is not true that an explanation is 
sufficient for being a normative reason for action. The difference is between explaining 
an action and guiding an action. Something that guides can be referenced so as to explain 
an action, however explanations are not themselves guides. If Jack’s and Bob’s 
motivations are normative reasons at all, they might be pro tanto reasons for Jack to have 
sex with Jill and Bob to end Bill’s life. However, Jack’s and Bob’s motivations, by 
themselves,
15
 could not be reasons, all things considered, for Jill to have sex with Jack or 
for Bill to never do anything ever again. This is because such motivations, by themselves, 
fail to be motivating for Jill and Bill and thus could never have guided their actions. 
3.3 The Guidance of Actual Actions 
One may argue that regardless of the Jill’s and Bill’s motivations, Jack and Bob 
will do what they themselves are most motivated to do. Since having sex with Jill and 
ending Bill’s life is what Jack and Bob are most motivated to do, this is what they will 
do. Since they will act because of their motivations, their motivations are action guiding 
and thus are normative reasons for action. However, this argument fails because such 
                                                 
15
 By “by themselves” I mean that there are no corresponding motivations in Jill’s or Bill’s subjective 
motivational set. For example, neither Jill or Bill has the motivation to satisfy Jack’s or Bob’s motivations. 
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motivations ultimately could not be action guiding. If what an agent is most motivated to 
do is just the motivation for which the agent did act, then this motivation could not be 
action guiding. It could not be action guiding because the agent could not fail to be 
guided. We cannot be guided by our motivations, if anything we do would count as 
following it.
16
 Therefore, being the motivations for which an agent actually acts is not 
sufficient for being a normative reason. 
3.4 Different Reasons for Different Agents 
Why could we not just say that there is a reason for Jack to have sex with Jill and 
Bob to end Bill’s life and no reason for Jill to have sex with Jack and Bill to have his life 
ended by Bob? As previously stated, Jack and Bob could have reasons for such actions, 
but that these are merely pro tanto reasons. In order to be all-in practical reasons, they 
must be reasons all things considered. Within the scope of all the things that need to be 
considered are the reasons for the necessary means for doing that action. For if there fails 
to be a reason, all things considered, for the necessary means of an action, then a pro 
tanto reason to do that action is defeated. For example, Nathan has a pro tanto reason to 
burn down his house, doing so would satisfy his desire to be warm, but no longer having 
shelter is part of the conditions of satisfaction of burning down his house.
17
 Suppose that 
Nathan has no reason, all things considered, to be without shelter. As such, Nathan’s pro 
tanto reason to burn down his house is defeated because he fails to have a reason for the 
necessary means.  
                                                 
16
 Christine Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," The Constitution of Agency, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 41. 
17
 I am supposing that Nathan does not have other means of shelter. Though this is a case in which I am 
appealing to conditions of satisfaction that are entailed by the specific account, it still explicates how not 
having a reason for the necessary means will defeat the pro tanto reasons for an end. 
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Likewise, in addition to the motivations of Jack and Bob and the resulting pro 
tanto reasons, the reasons for the necessary means for performing such actions need to be 
considered. Being that these are cases of interactions between agents, to meet the 
conditions of satisfaction for such actions entails that the other agents do or not do some 
or any action. Just as in the case of an action involving only one agent, if there fails to be 
a reason, all things considered, for the necessary means of an action, then a pro tanto 
reason to do that action is defeated. Thus, Jack’s and Bob’s pro tanto reasons are defeated 
when there fails to be a reason for the necessary means of their respective actions. As 
stated in section 3.1, if there fails to be a reason for Jill to have sex with Jack and Bill to 
never do anything again, then Jack’s pro tanto reason to have sex with Jill and Bob’s pro 
tanto reason to end Bill’s life are defeated. Thus, there is no reason for jack to have sex 
with Jill and Bob to end Bill’s life, all things considered. 
3.5 Universal Rational Requirement 
 Since Transmission** is a material conditional, every case in which the 
antecedent is true the consequent must also be true. So, it is never the case that there is a 
reason for someone to have sex with another person, if there is no reason for that other 
person to have sex with them. Also, it is never the case that there is a reason for someone 
to end another person’s life, if there is a reason for that other person to do something.  
Furthermore, if there is no reason for an agent to do  E, then rationality seems to require 
that the agent ought not to do E. Therefore, everyone ought not to have sex with another 
person, if there is no reason for that other person to have sex with them and everyone 
ought not to end another person’s life, if there is a reason for that other person to do 
something. These are categorical imperatives, negative duties required of all agents. 
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4.1 Further Objections 
 Now one may want to object that such universal rational requirements violate the 
thesis of reason internalism, since the required actions may not satisfy any element of an 
agent’s subjective motivational set. However, reason internalism only requires that the 
action satisfy some motivation, if there is a reason for the agent to do something. 
Whereas these negative duties state that there is no reason for the agent to do certain 
actions. There not being a reason for an action need not satisfy some motivation. For 
example, being without a motivation makes it the case that I have no reason to do some 
action. Further, reason requires that I do not do that action, if I have no reason to do it. 
Acting without a reason for that action would certainly be irrational.  
 With this said, one may question why I argued that it fails to be the case that there 
is no reason for Bill to do anything ever again to the conclusion that there is no reason for 
Bob to end Bill’s life. The objection is that according to the argument in the previous 
paragraph, in order for there to be no reason for Bill to do anything ever again, not doing 
anything need not satisfy any of Bill’s motivations. It being the case that there is no 
reason for Bill to do anything ever again is consistent with any of Bill’s motivations. Just 
as there is no reason for Bob to end Bill’s life is consistent with any of Bob’s 
motivations.  
 These two cases do seem to be very similar. However, there is one major 
difference between the two. Bob is required to not do one action, whereas Bill would be 
required to not do any action he could possibly be motivated to do.  Rationality would 
require a lot more of Bill than it does Bob, presumably too much more. I have not argued, 
and will not argue, for a thesis about the sufficient conditions for there being a reason for 
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action. Yet, I will suppose that of all the future actions that would satisfy some elements 
of Bill’s subjective motivational set, there would be at least one that would meet these 
conditions.  
4.2 Intended Actions without Reasons 
 Suppose an agent intends to do some action which that agent has no reason to do. 
For example, Jill intends to have sex with Jack, though she has no reason to do so. Jack 
finds Jill sexually attractive, does Jack have a reason, all things, considered, to have sex 
with Jill? Since Jill does not have a reason to have sex with Jack, Jack does not have a 
reason, all things considered, to have sex with Jill. Were Jack to have sex with Jill 
knowing only Jill’s intentions, we could say that Jack acted rationally, relative to a false 
belief, such as we did in Williams’s example about the tonic and petrol. We could say in 
some sense that he acted rationally, but he ought not to have had sex with Jill. Though, if 
Jack had all the true relevant facts knowing whether Jill had a reason, all things 
considered, to have sex with him and he still had sex with Jill, then we would say he did 
not act rationally and he ought not to have done so. 
4.3 Reductio Ad Absurdum 
 Others may object that my reasoning requires too much; that one ought not to buy 
beer, that two boxers ought not to hit each other, and that one ought not to hang a murder.  
The Case of Beer Money 
Suppose that the money I spend on beer could have gone to buying food for a 
starving person. One may argue that it is part of the conditions of satisfaction of my 
spending that money on beer that the starving person continues to starve. Yet, we suppose 
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that there is no reason for the starving person to continue to starve and thus no reason for 
me to buy beer. 
 The problem with this objection is that according to our general account of 
“necessary means,” the fact that the starving person continues to starve is not part of the 
conditions of satisfaction of my buying beer in all cases. We can imagine a case in which 
I spend my money on beer, but Peter Singer, being motivated to bring about more good in 
the world, buys the starving man food. Thus, I can be judged to have successfully 
purchased the beer even if the starving man fails to continue to starve. 
The Case of the Boxers 
 Suppose that Joe and George are in a boxing match. Joe’s hitting George will hurt 
George. George has no reason to allow himself to be hurt and good reason to avoid the 
punches. One may object that it follows from my reasoning that Joe has no reason to hit 
George, but this is absurd since Joe has a reason to hit George, so as to win the match. 
 It is true that it would be absurd in this case for Joe to not have a reason to hit 
George. However, the problem with this objection is that it would be absurd for George 
to enter into a boxing match if he has a reason, all things considered, to not allow himself 
to be hit. If George has a reason, all things considered, to enter into a boxing match, then 
George has a reason, all things considered, to allow himself to be hit in virtue of his 
reason to enter into the boxing match. This is because it is part of the necessary means of 
being in a boxing match that each boxer has a reason to hit each other, so as to win the 
match.
18
 Now, George does have a reason to avoid getting hit, so as to win the boxing 
                                                 
18
 It does seem possible that there could be a boxing match in which one boxer fails to hit the other. 
However, even in this case the one boxer has a reason to hit the other boxer. One may object that a boxer 
may fail to have a reason to hit the other boxer, if one boxer has a reason to lose the match (maybe that 
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match, but upon entering this competition he has provided Joe with a reason to hit him. 
This is just what it is to be in a boxing match. Thus, it would be irrational for George to 
have no reason, all things considered, to be hit and a reason, all things considered, for 
him to be in a boxing match. 
The Case of Hanging a Murder 
Suppose that Bill had done something such that he deserves to be hung and Bob is 
the hangman. Does it follow from the case of ending another person’s life that Bob ought 
not to hang Bill? Surely, if we read “deserved to be hung” as providing a reason for 
hanging him, then of course Bob ought to hang Bill, but this would just be begging the 
question. Rather, it should be read as describing the action Bill had done as being an 
action that would be grounds for being hung, if there are any grounds for being hung.  
Given my arguments in section 3.1, provided that Bill has reason to do things in 
the future, it follows that Bob ought not to hang Bill. However, suppose that Bill had a 
reason to engage in a contract with Bob that states that if either of them were to do an 
action, such as the action done by Bill, then the one ought to hang the other. In this case, 
Bill has a reason, in virtue of the reason for which he entered the contract, to be hung for 
having done such an action. I am not sure whether, Bill and Bob have a reason, all things 
considered, to agree to a contract with such dire consequences, but it is at least possible. 
There is a further question about whether Bill has a reason to uphold his contracts, which 
I will not address because it is a substantive question itself and falls outside the scope of 
this essay. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
boxer was paid to throw the match). However, it seems that this match is a charade and fails to be a real 
boxing match, in so far as real boxing matches are genuine competition and not some sort of theatrics. 
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5.1 No Positive Duties 
 It should be asked, why does my argument not extend to positive duties? Suppose 
Steve is drowning in a lake and Susan walks by the lake on her way to class. Susan could 
rescue Steve instead of going to class and doing so is without significant risk or expense 
to Susan. Furthermore, it is true of this case that if Susan continues to class, then Steve 
will drown. Ought Susan save Steve?  
 The argument I have given for negative duties does not extend to positive duties 
because of the use of the general account of necessary means. The fact that Steve would 
drown is not part of the conditions of satisfaction of Susan’s continuing to class. Again, 
this is because the fact that Steve would drown is not part of the conditions of satisfaction 
of Susan’s continuing to class in all cases. We can imagine a case in which Susan could 
successfully continue on to class and it fail to be the case that Steve drowns. Perhaps, 
Peter Singer is on his way to a lecture when he sees Steve drowning and saves him. Thus, 
it need not be the case that Steve drowns, if it to be the case that Susan successfully 
continues on to class in all cases. This is much different than the cases of negative duties, 
where in all cases it is part of the conditions of satisfaction that Jill has sex with Jack and 
Bill never does anything ever again, if it is to be the case the Jack has sex with Jill and 
Bob ends Bill’s life. 
5.2 No Problem for the Rational Authority of Morality 
 If we understand morality to include only negative duties, then there is no 
problem for the rational authority of morality. Agents do have negative duties in so far as 
there are actions which all agents fail to have reason to do them. These are actions for 
which it fails to be the case that there is a reason for the conditions of satisfaction of that 
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action to be met. Furthermore, it can fail to be the case that an agent has a reason to do 
such actions even if the agent is most motivated to do so. This is not inconsistent with the 
thesis of reason internalism because reason internalism only requires that an agent be 
motivated to do an action, not refrain from action. Additionally, the fact that the agent 
will do what they are most motivated to do fails to establish such motivations as a 
normative reason for action, all things considered.  
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